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# Narrative as Strategy: A Study on Central–Local Interaction in China's Tobacco Control Policy

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## Abstract

China's tobacco control policy presents a central-local asymmetric pattern characterized by "long-term absence of central legislation and continuous progress in local legislation." Against this institutional backdrop, how the central and local governments coordinate actions and form policy consensus on tobacco control has become a theoretical question in need of an answer. This study, based on the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) and integrated with the Social Construction of Target Populations (SCTP) theory, adopts a bilingual corpus comparative text analysis method to systematically code and analyze 110 central and local media reports and seven local tobacco control regulations from 2016 to 2026. The study finds that central and local narratives exhibit a coordinated model of "central government sets the direction, local governments ensure implementation." Central narratives construct the problem framework through the "villain-victim" pair and strong causal attribution; local narratives demonstrate action outcomes through the "hero-beneficiary" pair and emotional mobilization. Narrative characters correspond to target group types in the regulations: victims correspond to dependents, villains correspond to contenders and deviants, heroes correspond to the advantaged, and beneficiaries correspond to the service recipients of incentive-based tools. Under the constraint of absent national unified legislation, central narratives perform a compensatory function, providing a discursive framework and legitimacy foundation for local legislation; local legislation then provides supplementation through specific provisions. The two cases of Chongqing and Xi'an further reveal that when local interests conflict with central narratives, a pattern of narrative compliance but institutional deviation may emerge. This study expands the narrative interaction typology within the NPF by adding a new variant of narrative coordination, providing theoretical tools and empirical evidence for understanding the operational logic of policy narratives under a consensus-based political system.

**Keywords:** Narrative Policy Framework; Social Construction of Target Populations; tobacco control; central-local coordination; health communication

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## Introduction

As the world's largest producer and consumer of tobacco, China has over 300 million smokers(National Health Commission of China, 2021). Faced with this serious public health challenge, the Chinese government has been continuously advancing the construction of a tobacco control policy system.

However, unlike the conventional model in many public policy areas where the central government legislates and local governments implement, the evolution of China's tobacco control policy presents a unique pattern of local pioneering. Since 2014, when the former National Health and Family Planning Commission drafted the "Regulation on Smoking Control in Public Places (Draft for Review)" and submitted it to the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council, no breakthrough has been achieved in unified national tobacco control legislation. At the local level, however, since the "Shanghai Regulations on Smoking Control in Public Places" took effect in March 2010, becoming the first local tobacco control regulation enacted by a provincial people's congress in mainland China, local tobacco control legislation has shown a trend of continuous acceleration.

This is not merely a legislative phenomenon; it constitutes the core institutional landscape for understanding China's tobacco control policy process. Against this backdrop, a key question emerges: How is policy consensus formed between the central and local governments? This study employs the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF), combined with the Social Construction of Target Populations (SCTP) theory, to provide analytical tools for answering this question.

## Theoretical Framework

### *Narrative Policy Framework*

A policy narrative is a story with clearly defined structural elements that enables the public to understand policy implications and support policy proposals through storytelling(Guo, He, & Su, 2020). Jones and McBeth first established the theoretical positioning of the NPF in 2010, integrating narrative perspectives with empirical methods to analyze how policy narratives function within the policy process. At the micro level, it examines the influence of narratives on individual beliefs and behaviors; at the meso level, it focuses on the role of narratives in the formation and strategies of policy coalitions; and at the macro level, it explores how cultural and institutional narratives shape policy(Jones & McBeth, 2010). In 2014, Sabatier and Weible incorporated the NPF into the theoretical system of policy process theory, further noting that although the NPF was not yet widely applied in empirical research, its proponents had made it clearer and more transparent(Weible, 2014). Subsequent researchers have further supplemented the philosophical foundations of the theory, emphasizing the investigation of causal effects through empirical methods(Ming, 2019).

Specifically, the Narrative Policy Framework identifies the constituent elements of narratives in the policy process: setting, characters, plot, and moral. Among these, characters are the most central element of a policy narrative—they are the specific bearers of agency within the narrative and constitute the cognitive focus of the policy problem(Jones, Shanahan, & McBeth, 2014). According to the minimal operational definition of the NPF, a policy narrative must contain at

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least one character. It further classifies characters into four types: victims, villains, heroes, and beneficiaries. Victims are generally those who bear the burden of the policy problem; villains are those who produce the policy problem; heroes are those who solve the policy problem; and beneficiaries are those who gain from the resolution of the policy problem. The bearers of these characters can be either individuals or organizations. Among the four elements of the NPF, characters occupy the central position in the narrative structure, as they are not only the subjects driving the plot but also the personalized carriers of the moral. Given the central role of characters in the narrative, this study adopts character construction as the primary analytical dimension of the NPF, focusing on examining the differences in the portrayal of heroes, villains, victims, and beneficiaries in central versus local media narratives.

Building on previous research, this paper takes China's tobacco control policy as an empirical field and seeks to enrich the development and application of the NPF in the Chinese context.

***Integration of the Narrative Policy Framework and the Social Construction of Target Populations Theory***

The NPF provides a fine-grained structural tool for analyzing policy narratives, yet its theoretical resources for explanation remain limited. While it can describe the various elements of a narrative, it struggles to fully answer why a narrative is constructed in a particular way. This limitation has prompted scholars to seek integration of the NPF with other theories, including Schneider and Ingram's SCTP.

The core proposition of the SCTP is that target groups in policy are socially constructed into four categories: advantaged, contenders, dependents, and deviants. This social construction, combined with political power, determines the choice of policy tools. The theory posits that how a group is perceived by society directly affects the policy resources it receives. Social construction refers to the shared images, stereotypes, symbols, and value judgments assigned to particular social groups by the public, political elites, and the media. Groups with higher political power typically possess greater lobbying capacity, more direct access to decision-making channels, and stronger influence over public opinion; groups with lower political power often lack effective political representation and avenues for voicing their concerns. The two dimensions—social construction (positive/negative) and political power (high/low)—intersect to form four ideal types of target groups. At the explanatory level of policy tool selection, the theory provides a clear mechanism: the social construction of a target group shapes policymakers' perception of that group's deservingness, which in turn influences the choice of policy tools. This offers an analytical framework for understanding who gets what, and why, in policy design.

In recent years, some progress has also been made in integrating the NPF with the SCTP. In a study on weight policy, scholars drew on the target population framework and used the NPF to examine the impact of target groups' social construction on public policy support (Husmann, 2015). In terms of cross-context application, Terlizzi took Italian border management and external migration control as a case study, integrating the Social Construction of Target Populations theory with the NPF, and qualitatively traced the evolution of the narrative strategies of key government actors (Terlizzi, 2021). At the level of theoretical integration, Capano and Howlett systematically reviewed multiple analytical frameworks in public policy, pointing out that social construction and policy design theory can complement the NPF's shortcomings in explaining why narratives are persuasive (Capano & Howlett, 2020), that is, social construction

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determines the moral foundation of narratives, while narratives provide discursive expression for social construction.

**Table 1** Four types of target populations

| Social Construction | Political Power | Group Type | Policy Tool Orientation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Positive | High | Advantaged | Incentive-based tools (tax incentives, subsidies, privileges) |
| Negative | High | Contenders | Covert tools (regulation, restrictions, supervision) |
| Positive | Low | Dependents | Symbolic tools (public education, voluntary services) |
| Negative | Low | Deviants | Coercive tools (punishment, imprisonment, deprivation of rights) |

It is easy to discover that the NPF and SCTP have natural complementarity in explaining policy narratives: the NPF provides analytical tools for narrative structure, and the SCTP provides the dynamic mechanism of social construction. However, existing integrated studies have mostly focused on Western contexts and rarely involve the field of tobacco control policy. Therefore, building on the above theoretical integration, this study takes China's tobacco control policy as an empirical field to identify the mapping relationship between narrative characters and the social construction of groups, as well as how both interact with policy tools.

### *Research Methods*

This study adopts a bilingual corpus comparative text analysis method, constructing a media text corpus (Corpus A) and a policy text corpus (Corpus B) respectively, to analyze the structural correspondence between narratives and policies.

In terms of theoretical application, the analysis of Corpus A is guided by the NPF. However, given that the study focuses on the mapping between narrative characters and the social construction of target groups, we only select the character dimension from the NPF for coding. The analysis of Corpus B applies the SCTP. The two theories are linked through the "character–construction type" correspondence, supporting paired comparisons.

### *Theoretical Integration*

The NPF regards character construction as the core of the narrative, carrying attribution of responsibility and value judgments; the SCTP posits that policy tool selection depends on the social construction of target groups. Both point to the same proposition: the group images shaped by narratives resonate with the target groups and policy tools found in policy texts. NPF characters (heroes, villains, victims, beneficiaries) correspond to the four SCTP group types (advantaged, contenders, dependents, deviants) based on the polarity of social construction (positive/negative) and the level of power. Victims (positive, low power) correspond to dependents; villains (negative, high power) correspond to contenders; villains (negative, low

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power) correspond to deviants; heroes (positive, high power) correspond to the advantaged; beneficiaries (positive, variable power) can correspond to either the advantaged or dependents.

In the bilingual corpus comparative analysis of this study, this correspondence provides a direct operational bridge for cross-corpus pairing.

**Table 2** Correspondence between Character Roles in NPF and SCTP

| NPF Character Role | Social Construction | Typical Power Position | Corresponding SCTP Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Victim | Positive (innocent, in need of protection) | Low (lacking organizational resources) | Dependent |
| Villain (high power) | Negative (dangerous, should be restricted) | High (economic resources, organizational capacity) | Contender |
| Villain (low power) | Negative (illegal, immoral) | Low (individual, stigmatized) | Deviant |
| Hero | Positive (capable, trustworthy) | High (institutional authority, social prestige) | Advantaged |
| Beneficiary | Positive (benefiting, deserving recognition) | Variable | Advantaged or Dependent |

Therefore, in this study, the victim characters coded in Corpus A correspond to the groups coded as dependents in Corpus B; the villain characters coded in Corpus A correspond to the groups coded as either contenders or deviants in Corpus B; the hero characters coded in Corpus A correspond to the advantaged in Corpus B. The beneficiary characters in Corpus A, meanwhile, can correspond either to the advantaged or to the dependents.

In the coding design of Corpus B, in addition to classifying various groups into the four quadrants, this study separately adds a coding dimension for policy tool types. In the original theoretical framework of the SCTP, the social construction of target groups is not the end goal; rather, it aims to reveal how social construction influences the selection of policy tools.

In terms of specific policy tool selection, this study adopts four categories: prohibitive tools, punitive tools, persuasive tools, and incentive-based tools. The proposers of the SCTP once proposed a five-fold classification of policy tools: authoritative, incentive-based, capacity-building, symbolic and exhortative, and learning-based (Peters & Pierre, 2014). This study consolidates and translates these categories into the context of tobacco control policy, resulting in the four core tools. Prohibitive and punitive tools together constitute the authoritative tools based on the government's legitimate power in the original classification. Persuasive tools correspond to symbolic and exhortative tools. Incentive-based tools correspond to incentive-based, capacity-building, and learning-based tools. Ranging from coercive to guiding, these four types of tools form a complete policy spectrum, closely aligning with the mixed approaches actually used in tobacco control regulations. In coding practice, this classification has proven to be mature and operationalizable (Li, Yang, Wang, & Sun, 2023).

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### *Operational Procedures*

Step 1: Construct Corpus A of media policy narratives. Using the time window from 2016 to 2026, search for keywords such as "tobacco control," "smoke-free," and "e-cigarettes" on central and local government websites and media outlets. Screen and select texts from central and local media, and code them accordingly.

Step 2: Construct Corpus B of policy design texts. Select several cities that have enacted local tobacco control regulations as the analytical sample. Code each regulation.

**Table 3** Corpus B Coding

| Level 1 Category | Level 2 Category | Operational Definition |
|---|---|---|
| Social Construction Type | Advantaged (positive + high power) | Given a positive image and possessing relatively high power |
| | Contender (negative + high power) | Subjected to restrictions or obligations, but possessing relatively high power |
| | Dependent (positive + low power) | Given a positive protective image, but lacking power |
| | Deviant (negative + low power) | Given a negative description and lacking power |
| Policy Tool Type | Prohibitive Tool | Explicitly prohibits certain types of behavior |
| | Punitive Tool | Imposes penalties on violations |
| | Persuasive Tool | Encourages, prompts, or reminds |
| | Incentive-based Tool | Rewards compliance, provides smoking cessation support |

### *Data Analysis*

#### Construction and Analysis of Corpus A

A total of 212 initial news texts were obtained after multiple searches. The initial texts were systematically screened according to the following three criteria: First, the topic must focus on the core issues of China's tobacco control policy; any texts that merely mention economic data of the tobacco industry or are unrelated to policy issues were excluded. Second, the text content must present a complete narrative structure, particularly containing identifiable narrative characters. Third, the text must involve clear policy proposals or implementation actions, which should be reflected as actionable policy plans or implementation measures. Since some texts contained multiple themes, they needed to be split according to the criteria. Ultimately, 55 central media reports and 55 local media reports were selected, totaling 110 texts as the formal analytical sample.

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When coding all texts, to improve coding reliability and validity, two coders randomly selected 30 texts from the sample pool for pre-coding. After the two coders completed coding independently, the Kappa coefficient was used to test the coding consistency for each category. The results showed that Kappa values for all dimensions ranged from 0.764 to 0.968, with an average Kappa value of 0.853. During the formal coding phase, the average Kappa value for each node reached 0.87, demonstrating good coding consistency in this study (Sim & Wright, 2005).

### Construction and Analysis of Corpus B

The collection of local tobacco control regulation texts followed the dual screening principles of specificity and pairing. First, taking 2006, when the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) entered into force in China, as the starting point, specialized tobacco control regulations were retrieved from the National Laws and Regulations Database, Peking University Fabao, and the official websites of local people's congresses and governments. Provisions scattered in non-specialized laws such as the Advertising Law and the Law on the Protection of Minors were excluded. After retrieval, a total of 30 specialized tobacco control regulations were identified nationwide. Second, the cities where these regulations were enacted were cross-compared with the cities of the 55 local media reports in Corpus A. Only cities that had at least one tobacco control report in Corpus A were retained. This yielded seven cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Chongqing, Xi'an, Qingdao, and Wuhan, corresponding to seven specialized tobacco control regulations or measures. The sample size of Corpus B is seven regulations, totaling approximately 25,000 Chinese characters.

Unlike media texts, the language of regulations is highly formatted, with clear clause boundaries. Expressions regarding policy tools, protected subjects, and penalty measures are mostly objective statements, with rare rhetorical expressions. Because the subjectivity of coding is much lower than that of media texts, each regulation was coded independently by a single coder.

## *The Construction of Narrative Elements in China's Tobacco Control Policy*

### Overview of Central, Local Differences in Character Construction

In central narratives, the order of character mention rates is as follows: beneficiaries (218.2%) > villains (205.5%) > victims (196.4%) > heroes (158.2%). The highest mention rate of beneficiaries indicates that central narratives attach great importance to presenting policy outcomes. Villains and victims form a highly matched "problem maker–problem bearer" dyad, both with mention rates exceeding 195%, constituting the moral foundation for policy intervention. The mention rate of heroes is significantly lower than that of the other three character types.

In local narratives, the order of character mention rates is as follows: beneficiaries (267.3%) > heroes (209.1%) > villains (190.9%) > victims (187.3%). The mention rate of beneficiaries reaches 267.3%, meaning that on average each local report contains 2.67 references to beneficiaries, making beneficiaries the core constructed object in local narratives. Heroes have the second highest mention rate, forming a "beneficiary–hero" bimodal dominant pattern. In contrast, both villains and victims have relatively low mention rates and are comparatively marginalized.

Table 4

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Comparison of Character Mention Rates in Central and Local Narratives

| Narrative Subject | Rank | Character Type | Mention Rate |
|---|---|---|---|
| Central Narrative | 1 | Beneficiary | 218.2% |
| | 2 | Villain | 205.5% |
| | 3 | Victim | 196.4% |
| | 4 | Hero | 158.2% |
| Local Narrative | 1 | Beneficiary | 267.3% |
| | 2 | Hero | 209.1% |
| | 3 | Villain | 190.9% |
| | 4 | Victim | 187.3% |

**Note:** Mention rate = (Total number of occurrences of a given character type across all reports / Total number of reports) × 100%. Since the same character type can appear multiple times within a single report, mention rates can exceed 100%.

The NPF posits that one of the core functions of policy narratives is to provide a diagnosis of the policy problem. The villain character assumes the function of attribution, transforming an abstract social problem into an identifiable responsible subject. The victim character assumes the function of moral mobilization, evoking the audience's sympathy and demand for intervention by presenting the harm suffered by innocent parties. With a wrongdoer and a sufferer, the necessity of policy intervention becomes self-evident. In central narratives, the mention rates of villains (+14.6%) and victims (+9.1%) are higher than those in local narratives, continuing the traditional function of the central government as a framer of the policy problem. If "villains + victims" answer the question of why action is needed, then "heroes + beneficiaries" answer the question of what action has brought. The hero character assumes the function of demonstrating the acting subject, presenting who is solving the problem and how, providing replicable models and actionable pathways for policy implementation. The beneficiary character assumes the function of outcome justification, providing empirical support for policy continuity and legitimacy by showcasing groups that have gained benefits after policy implementation. Together, the two form a complete action narrative. In local narratives, the mention rates of heroes (+50.9%) and beneficiaries (+49.1%) are far higher than those in central narratives, clearly presenting a narrative orientation toward action outcomes. This distribution reflects the core division of labor between central and local narratives: central narratives take "villains–victims–beneficiaries" as a triangular pillar, completing the process from problem definition to policy intervention to outcome justification; local narratives take "beneficiaries–heroes" as a dual core, focusing more on the practical actors and beneficiary groups of policy implementation.

### *Central Narratives: Equal Emphasis on Problem Framing and Outcome Justification*

In central-level tobacco control media texts, character construction presents a dual structure: on the one hand, the high frequency of "villains + victims" continues the traditional function of the central government as a framer of the policy problem; on the other hand, the mention rate of beneficiaries is also high, indicating that central narratives likewise attach great importance to presenting policy outcomes, forming a narrative pattern that balances problem definition with outcome justification.

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### Construction of the Problem Framework: Villains and Victims

In central narratives, the mention rate of villains is 205.5%; the mention rate of victims is 196.4%. Both far exceed that of heroes, constituting the primary feature of central narratives. Their core function is to provide moral legitimacy for policy intervention. By clarifying who is doing harm and who is being harmed, the issue of tobacco control is embedded within a macro-narrative framework in which public health is threatened and state intervention is required. Take, for example, a 2016 report by CCTV News criticizing the smoking scenes in the film "Mr. Six." The report portrayed the film as a villain misleading adolescents, "completely disregarding Beijing's tobacco control regulations, a major failure in the excessive use of smoking scenes (ZY-09)." This criticism was not merely cultural commentary; rather, by constructing a villain image, it transformed smoking scenes in films into a public issue requiring policy intervention. At the same time, adolescent viewers were placed at the center of the narrative as potential victims. Through this narrative pairing, the legitimacy of policy intervention became self-evident. A 2021 CCTV Online report similarly followed this narrative logic. The report portrayed the e-cigarette industry as a villain adept at capturing adolescent psychology, while rural adolescents became victims "facing higher risks due to insufficient health literacy (ZY-46)." Notably, the report pointed out that e-cigarette marketing emphasizes elements such as coolness and freedom, transforming abstract industry practices into perceptible acts of enticement and reinforcing the moral negativity of the villain. The depiction of rural adolescents' insufficient health literacy highlighted the innocence and vulnerability of the victims. This pairing made the policy appeal more persuasive: strengthening regulation of e-cigarette marketing is necessary, especially to protect rural adolescents.

### Reinforcement of Outcome Justification: The Beneficiary Role

The mention rate of beneficiaries in central narratives is as high as 218.2%, meaning that on average each central report contains 2.18 references to beneficiaries. The high frequency of the beneficiary role allows central narratives to move beyond a purely problem-framing function, forming a closed loop from problem identification to solution to demonstrable results. Take, for example, the CCTV News report from May 2025 titled "Over 50,000 Fewer Acute Heart Attacks, Over 420,000 Fewer COPD Cases: Beijing's 10 Years of Tobacco Control Yield Remarkable Results." The report constructs "the 56,554 avoided acute heart attacks and 422,355 avoided COPD cases (ZY-53)" as policy beneficiaries, using authoritative data to demonstrate the actual effectiveness of tobacco control policies. This narrative strategy clearly serves multiple functions: for the public, beneficiary data makes abstract tobacco control outcomes perceptible; for policymakers, beneficiary evidence provides empirical support for policy continuity and expansion; for the international community, beneficiary outcomes showcase China's positive progress in implementing the FCTC. A 2019 response letter to a CPPCC proposal posted on the National Health Commission's official website constructs "citizens of tobacco control legislation cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Xi'an (ZY-21)" as a collective beneficiary, emphasizing the health gains brought by smoke-free environment construction. It is evident that beneficiaries in central media texts often appear as collective entities, presented through macro-level data or policy coverage, which complements the individualized beneficiary stories in local narratives discussed later.

### Relative Weakening and Its Internal Logic: The Hero Role

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In central narratives, the mention rate of heroes is only 158.2%, significantly lower than that of beneficiaries, villains, and victims. This distribution reflects the specific functional positioning of central narratives. The relative weakening of the hero role in central narratives does not mean that the central level disregards actors. On the one hand, under the issue of tobacco control, accepting the leadership of the Party Central Committee is taken for granted. Central narratives do not need to prove the legitimacy of action by constructing concrete heroic figures such as law enforcement officers or volunteers, as local narratives do, because the authority of policy itself stems from the central government's top-level design and institutional arrangements. On the other hand, the core concern of narratives at this level is to sufficiently demonstrate why action is needed and what action has brought. Local narratives may need heroes to demonstrate the feasibility of policy implementation, whereas central narratives need to establish the legitimacy of policy intervention and, even more so, need beneficiaries to authoritatively prove policy effectiveness.

**Triple Role Support**

Considering all four character types, central narratives form a triangular structure: the villain role assumes the function of attribution, concretizing the root causes of the problem into identifiable responsible subjects; the victim role assumes the function of moral mobilization, evoking demands for intervention by presenting the harm suffered by innocent parties; the beneficiary role assumes the function of outcome justification, reinforcing institutional authority by showcasing policy beneficiaries. Each element in this structure serves the central government's functional positioning: as the highest-level policy narrative subject, the relevant authorities need both to open space for policy through problem definition and to provide legitimacy for policy through outcome justification.

***Local Narratives: Dual Focus on Action and Outcomes***

In local-level reports, character construction presents a bimodal dominant pattern: the mention rate of beneficiaries reaches 267.3%, and that of heroes reaches 209.1%. This distribution reveals the action-outcome orientation of local narratives, showcasing the vivid practices and positive results of policy implementation through the frequent construction of heroic figures and beneficiary groups.

**Diverse Presentations of the Hero Role**

The mention rate of heroes in local narratives is as high as 209.1%, meaning that on average each local report contains at least two references to heroic figures. In contrast to the relative weakening of the hero role in central narratives, local media clearly focus more on the frontline actors implementing policy.

A 2025 Chongqing tobacco control report by CQNews constructed a diverse heroic spectrum: "Tobacco control legislators successfully established the rule of law foundation through the Chongqing Regulations on Smoking Control in Public Places; enforcers from 28 coordinated departments gave teeth to the regulations; builders from 3,557 smoke-free Party and government organs, 4,593 schools, and 561 enterprises started from micro-level units and successfully built a smoke-free ecosystem (DF-50)." Some local governments also portrayed entire units as heroic collectives working together to protect health, emphasizing "leading officials taking the lead in quitting smoking, and ordinary employees actively discouraging others (DF-18)." Heroes are not merely individuals but symbols of collective action. This conveys a core message through the

narrative: tobacco control is not the business of a few but a public action that everyone can and should take part in.

**The Recurring High Frequency of the Beneficiary Role**

The beneficiary role, with an extremely high occurrence rate of 267.3%, is also very noticeable, appearing on average 2.67 times per local report. Beneficiaries are not only a high-frequency role but also the core constructed object of local narratives, exhibiting multi-layered and multi-type characteristics.

Individual-transformation beneficiaries are the most compelling. Local reports describe citizens who successfully quit smoking under the influence of policy publicity: "I used to smoke two packs a day, but now I have not only quit myself but also advised others to quit (DF-23)." This allows readers to see vivid examples of beneficiaries. The core value of this type of beneficiary lies in being identifiable, empathizable, and imitable.

2. Group-data beneficiaries are the most persuasive. "Tens of thousands of acute heart attack cases reduced (DF-08)." Although such beneficiaries lack specific faces, their scale effect reinforces the persuasiveness of policy outcomes and transforms abstract policies into more perceptible health benefits.

3. Development-opportunity beneficiaries are the most forward-looking. Some local reports include compliant enterprises that gain opportunities for regulated development within the scope of beneficiaries: "He Ze, chairman of the company, signed the Letter of Commitment on Lawful and Honest Business Operations and stated that he would strictly regulate operations, actively cooperate with supervision, and jointly create a favorable market environment (DF-17)." This emphasizes the synergistic effects between tobacco control and industrial upgrading. Such beneficiaries expand the traditional dimension of health benefits, presenting the diverse positive impacts of tobacco control policy.

**Backgrounding of Villain and Victim Roles**

In contrast to the high-frequency presentation of beneficiaries and heroes, the mention rates of villains (190.9%) and victims (187.3%) in local narratives are notably lower than the former two. This means that in local narratives, who creates the problem or who is harmed is no longer the narrative focus and often recedes into background information.

This backgrounding has its own internal logic. Compared to opening moral space for policy, the core function of local narratives is to demonstrate the feasibility and positive outcomes of policy implementation. When central media have already deeply embedded narratives of tobacco harm and harm to minors in the public consciousness, local media need not repeatedly engage in attributive justification.

**A Closed Loop of Dual Focus: Action Demonstration and Outcome Justification**

The high frequency of the hero and beneficiary roles gives local narratives a dual-focus structure. The hero role assumes the function of action demonstration, answering who is acting and how, providing the public with replicable role models and actionable pathways through vivid examples of diverse action subjects. The beneficiary role assumes the function of outcome justification, answering what the action has brought, demonstrating the value of the policy. This positive narrative logic endows local narratives with a more tangible mobilizing force, aligning with the core functional positioning of local narratives: as demonstrators of policy

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implementation, they both showcase the feasibility of policy implementation and the active participation of diverse actors through the hero role, and prove the perceptibility of policy outcomes through the beneficiary role. Thus, the social mobilizing power of local narratives is constructed.

***The Compensatory and Supplementary Functions of Narratives***

In the field of tobacco control, China has long lacked unified national legislation. Narratives therefore assume a compensatory function. Institutional theory points out that there is a functional substitution relationship between formal institutions and informal institutions (North, 1990). When the supply of formal institutions is blocked, informal institutions can exert normative effects by building consensus, setting agendas, and shaping expectations, paving the way for subsequent institutionalization. We define this relationship as compensation.

The triangular structure of central narratives reveals their compensatory function in the absence of formal institutions. As noted in the previous analysis, the villain, victim, and beneficiary roles in central narratives form a stable triangular structure. Against the institutional backdrop of long-standing absence of unified national tobacco control legislation, this narrative structure actually substitutes for the prohibited objects, protected objects, and policy objectives that would otherwise be specified in legal texts. Through continuous problem framing and value justification, central narratives provide local actors with a unified discursive framework and a foundation of legitimacy, performing a quasi-legislative normative function. This is the core manifestation of compensation: informal institutional narratives assume alternative normative functions when formal institutional laws are absent.

The dual-focus structure of local narratives also reflects their supplementary support for local legislation. The high frequency of hero and beneficiary roles in local narratives indicates that local narratives focus on demonstrating the feasibility and outcomes of policy implementation. Narratives are not merely propaganda for local tobacco control practices but also a social validation of the effectiveness of local legislation. By presenting heroic figures such as law enforcers, volunteers, and successful quitters, as well as beneficiary figures such as members of the public with improved health and compliant enterprises, local narratives provide perceptible empirical support for the legitimacy and effectiveness of local legislation. In the context of absent central legislation, this narrative supplementation enables local legislation to gain social acceptance and implementation momentum more easily.

The complementary relationship between the two narrative structures constitutes a complete "compensation-supplementation" mechanism. Central narratives are responsible for setting the direction, establishing the cognitive framework of the policy problem through villain and victim roles. Local narratives are responsible for ensuring implementation, demonstrating execution outcomes through hero and beneficiary roles. When the central government cannot directly regulate local behavior through law, central narratives maintain the unity of policy discourse through compensation. When local governments need further legitimacy for their own legislation, local narratives provide outcome evidence through supplementation. The two support each other, jointly facilitating the operation of the policy system.

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## Structural Correspondence between Narrative and Policy

Immunization programs are national programs, which means communication has to fit the realities of the society in which the program operates. If a country wants the program to work well, it has to engage with society, engage with stakeholders, and especially engage with parents in thinking through what the program should look like, what it should do, what it should protect against, and how convenient it should be. What really matters is not forcing an international framework onto a local setting, but making sure the communication approach truly fits the local social context.

### *Comparison of Institutional Features of Seven Local Regulations*

To reveal the correspondence between media narratives and policies, this study first systematically compares the seven local tobacco control regulations in Corpus B. The basic coded data are presented below.

**Table 5** Results of Social Construction of Target Groups

| City of Regulation | Advantaged | Contenders | Dependents | Deviants |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chong qing | 18 | 4 | 12 | 12 |
| Wuhan | 20 | 3 | 8 | 6 |
| Shen zhen | 25 | 5 | 10 | 10 |
| Xi'an | 15 | 3 | 9 | 4 |
| Shang hai | 18 | 3 | 8 | 5 |
| Beijing | 16 | 3 | 9 | 5 |
| Qingdao | 14 | 2 | 7 | 3 |

**Table 6** Results of Social Construction of Target Groups

| City of Regulation | Prohibitive Tools | Punitive Tools | Persuasive Tools | Incentive-based Tools |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chong | 6 | 4 | 6 | 2 |

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| City of Regulation | Prohibitive Tools | Punitive Tools | Persuasive Tools | Incentive-based Tools |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| qing | | | | |
| Wuhan | 5 | 3 | 5 | 2 |
| Shen zhen | 7 | 5 | 6 | 4 |
| Xi'an | 4 | 3 | 5 | 1 |
| Shang hai | 5 | 3 | 5 | 3 |
| Beijing | 6 | 4 | 5 | 3 |
| Qingdao | 5 | 3 | 4 | 1 |

**Note:** Coding is based on the SCTP. Advantaged = positive image + high political power; Contenders = negative image + high political power; Dependents = positive image + low political power; Deviants = negative image + low political power. Prohibitive tools = provisions that explicitly ban certain behaviors; Punitive tools = independent penalty provisions; Persuasive tools = publicity/education, signage, or discouragement obligations; Incentive-based tools = smoking cessation services, rewards, or recognition. The values are reference point counts. For a given provision, the same type of tool or group is counted only once. Data source: tobacco control regulation texts of the seven cities.

The seven regulations come from Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Chongqing, Xi'an, Qingdao, and Wuhan, covering different regions of eastern, central, and western China. They present a highly consistent overall framework in the construction of the four types of groups—advantaged, contenders, dependents, and deviants—but differ in specific composition, intensity of construction, and level of detail.

## Comparison of Social Construction of Target Groups

In all seven tobacco control regulations, the advantaged group consists of government regulatory departments, which are assigned responsibilities such as leadership, coordination, and supervision of enforcement, reflecting the principle of government-led action. The intensity of construction varies depending on how detailed the regulation lists the relevant departments: Shenzhen is highest (25 points), where the regulation lists 29 member units of the joint conference and their respective responsibilities; Qingdao is lowest (14 points). However, this difference stems from the level of legislative detail rather than substantive institutional divergence.

The contenders include premises managers and tobacco sellers, who are obligated to establish systems, post signs, discourage smoking, etc., and violators are subject to penalties. All regulations specify the responsibilities of premises operators, but the intensity of regulation on tobacco sellers and enterprises varies: Shenzhen is the most detailed (5 points), Qingdao the most

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brief (2 points); Chongqing and Beijing include tobacco enterprises as contenders, reflecting a stricter regulatory orientation.

Dependents include the general public, minors, non-smokers, children, pregnant women, etc. Policies toward them are primarily symbolic support, including publicity and education, signage, and obligations to discourage smoking. All city regulations are highly consistent in this regard.

Deviants primarily consist of individuals who smoke in violation of the rules, as well as those who sell tobacco to minors or publish illegal advertisements. Policies toward them are primarily coercive punishment. The intensity of construction is positively correlated with the level of detail of penalty provisions and the amount of fines: Chongqing (12 points) and Shenzhen (10 points) have separate penalty provisions for various violations, resulting in higher scores; Xi'an (4 points) and Qingdao (3 points) have more coarse penalty provisions and lower scores.

Overall, the construction of dependents is the most consistent across local tobacco control regulations, reflecting a broad consensus on values; the intensity of construction for contenders and deviants is positively correlated with the level of legislative detail and regulatory strictness of each city.

**Comparison of Policy Tool Configuration**

The seven regulations show clear differences in the four types of tools, prohibitive, punitive, persuasive, and incentive-based, reflecting the different orientations of tobacco control legislation across cities.

Prohibitive tools refer to provisions that explicitly ban smoking. Shenzhen has the highest number of such provisions (7), followed by Chongqing and Beijing (6), with Xi'an the lowest (4). Except for Chongqing, all six other cities have achieved comprehensive smoking bans in indoor public places, workplaces, and public transportation. Chongqing, by allowing smoking areas in three types of indoor premises, catering services, accommodation services, and public entertainment venues, is the only partially compliant city, with a substantially weaker substantive smoking ban than the other cities.

Punitive tools show dual differences: the amount of fines and the level of detail of penalty provisions. For individual fines, Xi'an imposes only 10 yuan; Qingdao has a flat fine of 200 yuan without gradation; the other cities have graded fines (e.g., different amounts for first-time violators versus those who refuse to correct), with Shenzhen and Beijing setting maximums of 500 yuan. For institutional fines, Beijing has a maximum of 200,000 yuan, Shenzhen 100,000 yuan, and Xi'an only 1,000 yuan. The level of detail in penalty provisions also varies. Shenzhen has the most (5 provisions), with separate penalties for individual smoking, operator non-compliance, illegal tobacco sales, etc.; Chongqing and Beijing each have 4 provisions; most other cities have 3 provisions.

Persuasive tools include publicity and education, no-smoking signage, obligations to discourage smoking, etc. All seven cities are highly consistent in providing such tools. Shenzhen and Chongqing each have 6 points, Wuhan, Xi'an, Shanghai, and Beijing each have 5 points, and Qingdao has 4 points. The differences mainly stem from the level of detail regarding responsibilities for publicity and education: Shenzhen systematically specifies the publicity and education responsibilities of multiple departments; Chongqing specifically establishes centralized activities such as Smoke-Free Day; Qingdao is the most brief. This consistency undoubtedly reflects the broad consensus on "prevention first, publicity foremost."

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Incentive-based tools include smoking cessation services, reporting rewards, recognition, volunteer participation, etc. Shenzhen has 4 points (smoking cessation services, reporting rewards, volunteer participation); Shanghai and Beijing each have 3 points; Wuhan and Chongqing each have 2 points; Xi'an and Qingdao each have 1 point. The variation in the configuration of incentive tools reflects cities' fiscal capacity and governance philosophy: more developed cities such as Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Beijing place greater emphasis on positive incentives, while Xi'an and Qingdao rely more on coercive and persuasive tools.

### *Social Construction of Target Groups: From Media Narrative to Regulatory Text*

Central and local media narratives present a clear functional division: central narratives focus on problem framing, frequently constructing victims and villains; local narratives focus on action demonstration, frequently constructing heroes and beneficiaries. This division aligns with the institutional pattern of China's tobacco control policy, in which central legislation is absent and local legislation pioneers. Comparing the central-local narrative data with the construction intensity of the four target group types in the seven city regulations reveals a macro-level correspondence—the moral legitimacy and public pressure provided by central narratives match the construction of dependents and deviants in the regulations, while the social recognition and implementation momentum conveyed by local narratives complement the construction of advantaged groups and beneficiaries in the regulations.

### Victim Narrative and Dependent Construction: Top-Down Transmission of Moral Legitimacy

The mention rate of the victim role in central narratives is as high as 196.4%, ranking just below beneficiaries (218.2%) and villains (205.5%), making it a core pillar of the central narrative problem framework. Through extensive reporting on the harms of secondhand smoke to children, pregnant women, and public health, central media shape a collective image of innocent victims, anchoring the tobacco control issue on the moral high ground of protecting the vulnerable.

This narrative receives an institutionalized response in the regulatory texts. All seven city regulations list minors, the public, pregnant women, etc., as dependents, and the intensity of construction is generally high (points range from Qingdao's 7 to Chongqing's 12). The core characteristics of dependents perfectly match the victim role in the narrative: positive construction, low political power, need for symbolic protection, and so on. More importantly, the construction of dependents shows virtually no substantive variation across cities. Regardless of economic development level or stringency of tobacco control, all regulations without exception list minors as key protected subjects and set special outdoor smoke-free zones around schools and kindergartens. This highly consistent institutional arrangement confirms the powerful shaping force of the victim protection discourse in central narratives—when central media repeatedly emphasize "young people are the future of the motherland" and "secondhand smoke harms children," local legislators can hardly overlook the protection of minors in their regulations.

In terms of construction intensity, the difference between cities with higher dependent points (Chongqing 12, Shenzhen 10) and Qingdao (7) is primarily due to the level of detail in the regulatory text, rather than any substantive weakening of dependent status. The victim discourse in central-local narratives has formed a cross-provincial policy consensus. Local legislation has no choice on the question of who to protect: although unified legislation is absent, the central government, through narrative, sets an unavoidable moral agenda for local legislation.

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**Villain Narrative and Contender/Deviant Construction: Institutionalizing Attributional Pressure**

The mention rate of the villain role in central narratives is as high as 205.5%, making it the second most frequent role after beneficiaries. Central media construct tobacco enterprises, violators who smoke, non-compliant operators, and others as problem makers. This provides an institutionalized target for contenders and deviants in the regulations.

The contenders in the regulations, premises managers, tobacco sellers, etc., are precisely the conceptualized images of the villain role in central narratives. All seven city regulations impose clear obligations on operators, such as discouraging smoking, posting signs, not providing ashtrays, etc., with penalties for violations. The intensity of contender construction varies across cities: Shenzhen is highest (5 points), Qingdao lowest (2 points). This variation is related to the importance each city places on tobacco control enforcement, but even in the most brief case of Qingdao, the regulation clearly specifies the basic obligations of operators. This indicates that central narratives have successfully established operator responsibility as an essential element of tobacco control legislation.

The deviants in the regulations, primarily individuals who smoke in violation of the rules, are the institutionalized expression of the "rule-breaker" in central narratives. The intensity of deviant construction is highly correlated with the severity of punishment: Shenzhen and Chongqing have high deviant points (10-12 points), with detailed penalty provisions and higher fines; Xi'an and Qingdao have low points (3-4 points), with brief penalties and very low fines. It is worth noting that the villain role in central narratives does not distinguish between "high-power villains" (tobacco enterprises, operators) and "low-power villains" (individual smokers), but the regulations, through the distinction between contenders and deviants, achieve differentiated regulation of villains at different power levels—contenders are subject primarily to implicit constraints, emphasizing obligations and supervision; deviants are subject primarily to coercive punishment, such as fines.

**Hero Narrative and Advantaged Construction: Social Mobilization of Action Legitimacy**

The mention rate of the hero role in local narratives is as high as 209.1%, far exceeding the 158.2% in central narratives. Local media extensively report heroic images such as law enforcement personnel, tobacco control volunteers, successful quitters, and smoke-free unit builders, transforming tobacco control policy from government requirements into social action. This narrative provides social recognition and implementation momentum for the advantaged group in the regulations, namely, government departments and regulatory agencies at various levels.

The construction of advantaged groups in the regulations is universal; all seven city regulations clearly specify advantaged actors, and their core responsibilities are highly consistent: organization and leadership, joint conferences, division of labor among departments, supervision, and enforcement. This commonality itself reflects the broad recognition of government authority in local narratives. The high frequency of appearances by law enforcement personnel and regulatory agencies helps shape public trust in the government's tobacco control capacity, making it necessary for legislators to specify the responsibilities of advantaged actors in detail. Even in Qingdao, which has the most brief construction of advantaged actors (14 points), the regulation clearly specifies the leadership responsibilities of the Patriotic Health Campaign Committee and the health administrative department. However, the level of detail in advantaged

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construction varies across cities: Shenzhen's advantaged points reach as high as 25, while Qingdao has only 14. This variation to some extent reflects differences in the level of legislative detail across cities, related to local governance traditions and administrative styles.

**Beneficiary Narrative and Beneficiary Construction: Social Proof of Policy Outcomes**

The mention rate of the beneficiary role in local narratives is as high as 267.3%, the highest of all seven character roles. Local media report images of successful quitters, members of the public with improved health, compliant enterprises gaining development opportunities, and other beneficiaries, providing outcome justification for tobacco control policy. This narrative is reflected in the regulations as the configuration of incentive-based tools, such as smoking cessation services, reporting rewards, and smoke-free unit recognition, transforming the beneficiaries in the narrative into actual beneficiaries in the system.

All seven city regulations provide at least one type of incentive-based tool. Basic smoking cessation services exist in all cities. This commonality indicates that the high-frequency presentation of beneficiaries in local narratives has created a social expectation that tobacco control policy should benefit the public, making it difficult for legislators to pass regulations without any incentive-based tools. Even in Xi'an and Qingdao, which have the fewest incentive-based tools (1 point each), the regulations explicitly require health administrative departments to provide smoking cessation counseling services.

In summary, the macro-correspondence between the central-local narrative division and the construction of target groups in the regulations reveals the interaction mechanism between narrative and institutions. Central narratives, through the high-frequency construction of victims and villains, provide moral legitimacy and an attributional framework for dependents and contenders/deviants in the regulations. Local narratives, through the high-frequency construction of heroes and beneficiaries, provide social recognition and outcome justification for advantaged groups and beneficiaries in the regulations. The division of labor—"central government sets the direction, local governments ensure implementation"—is also institutionally expressed in the regulatory texts: dominated by central narratives, the construction of dependents and deviants is relatively uniform, while the construction of advantaged groups and beneficiaries, though varying locally, is universal and responds to the social mobilization function of local narratives.

***The Gap between Narrative and Action under Narrative Coordination:* The Cases of Chongqing and Xi'an**

In this study, we analyze the tension between narrative and institutions using the regulations of Chongqing and Xi'an as case studies. Both central and local media tell stories of comprehensive smoke-free environments and strict enforcement, yet the regulations in these two cities exhibit certain gaps from this narrative in key institutional designs. This section analyzes these two regions to illustrate how narrative coordination encounters institutional compromise, demonstrating that the relationship between narrative and institutions in tobacco control policy is a complex interaction mediated by local interests, governance capacity, and political will.

**Chongqing: Comprehensive Smoke-Free Narrative vs. Indoor Smoking Area Exemption**

Chongqing is the only city among the seven where indoor smoking area exemptions exist. Article 8 of its regulation explicitly states, "Smoking is prohibited in indoor areas of public places," but immediately follows with a proviso allowing the designation of smoking areas in three types of indoor premises: catering service venues, accommodation service venues, and

public entertainment venues. This institutional design directly contradicts the narrative's long-standing advocacy for "comprehensive smoking bans in all indoor public places."

The underlying cause of this tension lies in the profound influence of local industrial interests. Chongqing is a major province for tobacco cultivation and cigarette production, and the tobacco industry has a significant impact on local fiscal revenue and tobacco farmers' income (Cai, Chen, Zhu, et al., 2015). During legislative research, a municipal people's congress representative and the director of the Fuling Cigarette Factory of China Tobacco Chongqing Industrial Co., Ltd. explicitly stated that overly stringent tobacco control measures would be undesirable, arguing that although tobacco control is an inevitable trend, the tobacco industry also invests heavily in poverty alleviation and education; if measures are too strict, fiscal tax revenue and the income of farmers and retailers would decline(Yan, 2020) . Research by Duke Kunshan University, based on interviews with policymakers and experts, also found that Chongqing's retention of indoor smoking areas in local legislation directly stems from resistance from the tobacco industry during the legislative process(Ren, 2025).

This gap between narrative and institutions essentially reflects the outcome of a contest between central discursive authority and local industrial interests: maintaining consistency with the central government in narrative while leaving room for local interests in institutions.

**Xi'an: "Strictest Smoking Ban" vs. "10 Yuan Fine"**

Xi'an has the lowest individual fine among the seven cities. Article 25 of the Xi'an Administrative Measures for Smoking Control (effective November 1, 2018) states: "Anyone who smokes in a place where smoking is prohibited in violation of these Measures shall be given a warning and a fine of ten yuan by the tobacco control supervision and administration department." The maximum institutional fine is only 1,000 yuan. Xi'an has the lowest individual fine among the seven regulations, at just 10 yuan. This fine amount is at the lowest level among all tobacco control regulations nationwide, forming a sharp contrast with the narrative's long-standing calls for "strict enforcement" and "raising the cost of violations."

From the perspective of media narratives, when reporting on tobacco control enforcement, the media often adopt a discursive framework of "strictest smoking ban." This narrative strategy places enforcement actions—rather than penalty severity—at the center of reporting. However, the reasons for the tension between this "strictest" narrative and the 10 yuan fine are complex. As a western city, Xi'an's tobacco control legislation came relatively late, and enforcement resources and experience are relatively limited. From enforcement data: as of September 2019, Xi'an had imposed a total of over 388,000 yuan in fines on smokers and non-compliant enterprises, deploying over 162,000 enforcement personnel (Wenming Xi’an, 2019) , resulting in an extremely low average fine per enforcement action.

This also indicates that when local enforcement capacity is limited and social consensus is insufficient, regulations may opt for symbolic penalties to achieve passage, while the narrative continues to maintain a strict tone consistent with the central government. This misalignment between weak institutional constraints and strong discursive narratives is a typical dilemma in local implementation of tobacco control policy.

**Theoretical Implications of the Narrative-Action Gap**

The cases of Chongqing and Xi'an meaningfully complicate the core argument of this chapter. They show that narrative coordination does not mean complete consistency between narrative

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and institutions; rather, under pressure from central discourse and constraints of local interests and capacity, local actors may adopt a strategy of narrative compliance but institutional compromise. Specifically, media narratives continue to use the central government's advocated discourse of "comprehensive smoke-free" and "strict enforcement," while regulatory texts make room for local interests or implementation difficulties through exception clauses or symbolic penalties.

From the theoretical perspective of the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF), this finding challenges the simple model of narrative-to-policy influence and response, suggesting that we need to incorporate factors such as local interests, administrative capacity, and political will into the analytical framework of narrative-institution relations. The cases of Chongqing and Xi'an demonstrate that narrative coordination does not necessarily lead to institutional coordination; when local interests conflict with central narratives, a pattern of narrative compliance but institutional divergence may emerge. This both supplements the applicability of the NPF and provides a new analytical perspective for understanding the complex interaction between discourse and institutions in China's policy process.

## Conclusion

The narrative competition hypothesis of the NPF presupposes an institutional environment in which multiple interest groups compete for discursive power in an open and competitive policy subsystem. However, this study finds that the interaction between central and local narratives in China's tobacco control policy exhibits a distinct pattern of consensus and coordination. In terms of character construction, central narratives focus on the "villain-victim" pair, emphasizing problem framing and providing moral legitimacy for policy intervention; local narratives focus on the "hero-beneficiary" pair, emphasizing action demonstration and outcome justification. Rather than adversarial rhetoric that demonizes opponents or glorifies oneself, central and local narratives form a functionally complementary pattern of "central government sets the direction, local governments ensure implementation."

The universality of policy tool configurations further confirms the institutionalized effects of narrative coordination. The seven local regulations are highly consistent in punitive and persuasive tools, and basic incentive-based tools are also universally present. If one were to reason from the logic of narrative competition, localities should exhibit significant tool differentiation, but the opposite is true. The central-local coordinated division of labor explains this consistency. Central narratives provide legitimacy for punitive and persuasive tools, while local narratives provide the foundation for social mobilization of incentive-based tools. The cases of institutional compromise in Chongqing and Xi'an serve as boundary evidence for narrative coordination: even when institutions deviate from central requirements, local media strive to maintain discursive consistency, forming a pattern of "narrative compliance, institutional deviation," which in turn reinforces the dominance of narrative coordination.

Against the institutional backdrop of long-term absence of unified national tobacco control legislation, central narratives perform a compensatory function through problem framing and value justification, providing a discursive framework and legitimacy foundation for local legislation; local legislation then provides supplementation through specific provisions. This

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interactive pattern is not a zero-sum game among interest groups, but rather a discursive collaboration and institutional complementarity between central and local governments. Thus, China's tobacco control policy narratives build consensus on tobacco control through functional complementarity and discursive linkage between central and local levels.

## Competing interests

The author(s) declared no competing interests.

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